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3/7/2011I just run over wikipedia's clothing history page(link), and found something might be interesting. It's not surprised that the fashion clothing of human becomes shorter and more elegant after thousands of years' evolution. That is, people used to wear rougher robe and take longer hat or veil in our history across cultures. But now days, we wear short shirt, suit, hat, and take off veils for most of countries. Consistently, our scientific technology developed much faster than ever before. Why? I'm thinking there might be a correlation between human's fashion type and creativity. That is, the much shorter, more elegant and open clothing might loose human's conservative mind, which makes us behave more open and creative. Look around the world now, the current most creative scientific work has been done in Western countries (eg. US, Germany, UK, Belgium, etc) or in the countries adapted the modern fashion clothing for years (eg. Japan, China). However, readers might also argue that the creative work should also be correlated with the richness of a country, but I think it is not necessary. For instance, some of the middle East countries (eg. Saudi Arabia) are rich, but relatively less creative work has been done there. How does this come? I think the type of clothing might be contributed to the explanation.
To be more specifically, longer clothing, like robe or veil, covers most part of our human body, which seems as a way to protect ourselves from immoral observing or hurt (eg. Injured by the cold weather). Hence, this type of clothing could be seen as a kind of prevention cue, as the function of this clothing highlights on the prevention function. On the other hand, shorter and elegant clothing is more open. Wearing this kind of clothing might cause people feel more freely to explore the outside world. So the short and elegant clothing might be signaled as a kind of promotion cue. Previous research has suggested that promotion cues bolster both creative insight and creative generation rather than the prevention cues(Friedman & Forster, 2001). Therefore, I suspect that the shorter and elegant clothing might further facilitate more creative mind set.
We can test this hypothesis from different ways. For instance, one basic experiment could be done. Participants might be asked to choose one cloth from the two types. One type of cloth is short and elegant , but the other type of cloth is long and thick. After this task, people are asked to choose one of the two mobile phones (One is Iphone4, which is more creative. The other is Nokia phone with the same price. Note: You can find Nokia phone with same price as iphone in market). If my hypothesis is correct, people who choose short cloth might be more likely to choose Iphone, too. Furthermore, male participants could also be asked to rate the beauty of women from two groups of pictures. One group women wear shorter dress, but the same women in other group wear longer robe. If those men who rated pictures are further asked to choose one of the mobile phone, I predict that the men who rated women with shorter dress might be more likely to choose creative mobile phone(eg. iphone4), too. In addition, a real life study could also be tested. As we know, people wear shorter and thinner in summer ,but wear longer and thicker in winter. Therefore, according to my hypothesis, the more creative product should be sold better in summer than winter, however, we also need to control other factors (eg. Public holidays ) when test this. So you might become a person like "Thomas Edison", after you get off the” longer robe”.
3/4/2011Just got some time to rethink about the Macbeth effect. Zhong and Liljenquist (2006, paper) suggested that people have needs to clean themselves after their moral purity is at stake. Like lady Macbeth, people believe that washing themselves could remove sins. For instance, the authors showed that people are more likely to choose washing products after they feel their morality is threatened. I'm thinking: does the so called "washing effect" only happen when people feel their moral purity is in threaten (eg. Recall unethical deed from past)? I, myself, sometimes also feel that taking a bath might also wash away my bad luck. So my question is: when you feel unlucky, do you also have an intention to choose detergent products more often than other types of products, does the concept of washing yourself become more accessible in your mind when you got so damned bad luck? Does cleaning our body only remove the immorality, or does the washing effect also remove all the negative feeling? It's not so clear from the original paper (See my former attached paper link). Furthermore, for the positive event on you, such as when you have good luck or feel morally good, do you still have the need to wash yourself? Interestingly, the traditional chinese culture believe that washing your body could wash away your good luck (See the link here) Wish all of you who read this note have a lot of good lucks, but remember to take a shower for confronting another different good luck :) 3/1/2011 This is a draft of my proposal, and I might present it in one of the next Tuesday sessions. Welcome to comment on it. If you don't like it, throw it in the dustbin :)
Disgust, as an universal emotion, is believed to originate in the mammalian bitter taste rejection system. People who have experienced relevant unpleasant tasting bitter, sour or salty express a strong emotion of disgust (Chapman et al., 2009). Rozin, Haidt and Fincher (2009) suggested this evaluation of disgust reflected our most basic biological reaction to avoid the physical disgusting source, and the “disgust output” came out even without cognitive evaluation. Rozin and Fallon (1987) mentioned the disgust is original food-related emotion, which protects us to get disease from the disgusting source. Rozin, Haidt and Fincher(2009) pointed out, during human’s evolution, our disgust output system was harnessed to a disgust evaluation system which responded not to our sensory inputs (eg. Bitter flavor) but to more cognitive appraisals (eg. spider). That is, the disgust evaluation system originally worked for evaluating potential risky food on the basis of the food’s nature or perceived origin. Later on, the category which elicited the feeling of disgust was enlarged though some combination of biological and cultural evolution. Hence, the disgust evaluation system started to deal with other types of disgust, like the reminder of our animal nature and moral offense (Rozin, Haidt & Fincher, 2009). It seems that those further mentioned moral violation (offense) shares a closing relationship with other basic pathogen disgusting source (eg. disgusting food), since all these elicitors actually activate similar disgust output. Therefore, Chapman et al. (2009) argued that the feeling of disgust is evolved from oral to moral. Several evidence has been found to support this argument. For instance, Zhong and Liljenquist (2006) reported that physical cleansing alleviates the upsetting consequences of unethical behavior and reduces threats to one's moral self-image, which suggested a psychological association between bodily purity and moral purity. In other words, their research inferred that the physical disgust is correlated with a abstract level of moral disgust. Another research from Schnall et al. (2008) found that priming people with the physical disgust source would make subsequent moral judgment more severe. Furthermore, evidence from neuroscience suggested that both of the temporal and frontal cortices in our brain were activated when people either feel physical disgust or moral disgust (Moll et al., 2005). More interestingly, Chapman et al. (2009) found that participants showed a similar facial motor activity when they experienced disgusting taste, saw disgusting pictures or was involved in unfair decision making. More and more evidence like those aforementioned suggested that our moral judgment and gustatory judgment might share a same disgust evaluation system. Recently, Eskine, Kacinik and Prinz (2011) reported that people’s taste perception could significantly influence their moral judgment. That is, the more immoral judgment outcome could be introduced by guiding people experience a physically disgusting taste. These authors ascribed the reasons of their finding to the association link between physical disgust and moral disgust, such that disgusting taste perception would elicit greater disgusting feeling on moral evaluation. This finding itself revealed a consistent prediction with the “disgust is from oral to moral” hypothesis. In addition, it also suggested that our embodiment processing could influence our moral judgment that is seen as a high level cognitive processing. However, our current question is: Does the high level of cognitive processing influence our embodiment processing?
We argue that if the reported effect is indeed due to the morally introduced feeling of disgust, we might suspect that the feeling of moral disgust could subsequently trigger our sensitivity change for our taste perception, since disgust as a general emotion could reflect our reaction on both taste perception and perception on moral judgment. In addition, if the moral feeling of disgust belonging to the same category as the disgust feeling from physical disgust, we might also expect that the morally introduced feeling of disgust would cause a more physical disgust feeling from the taste in food or drinks. As suggested by Schwarz and Clore (1983), affect as a type of information, were also frequently used in our decision making. Therefore, we predict people who experienced a moral disgust might be easily to transfer their feeling of disgust to other domains, such as their taste perception. As the flavor of bitter, sour and salty are much correlated with the basic gustatory of disgust (Chapman et al., 2009), we suspect that people might become more sensitive towards these taste flavors. That is, people might feel more sour, bitter, or salty if they feel morally disgusted. On the other hand, other taste like spicy and sweet are irrelevant with the feeling of disgust. Hence, we didn’t expect the morally introduced feeling of disgust would influence people’s perception on these taste. As follows, three studies are proposed to test our hypothesis.
Study 1 aims to figure out if our taste perception could be influenced by previous introduced moral judgment, especially by the introduced moral disgust feeling. The experiment is a 5(Beverage types: sweet, salty, sour, bitter, spicy)* 2 (Moral judgment type: moral disgust, moral control) between subjects design. Both beverage type and moral judgment type are between subject factors. Participants are asked to evaluate one type of liquid juice after they evaluate either moral disgusting stories or control stories, and the liquid juice is randomly selected from one of the five options which have different taste. We predict that people might report more flavor of salty, sour or bitter in the moral disgust condition than those in the control condition. But there might be no effect for the sweet or spicy juice.
Study 2 tries to replicate study 1, and further intend to show that our taste could be misled by the introduced feeling of disgust even without physical contracting with the stimulis owning flavors (eg. Water). Furthermore, if our prediction is correct, we also suspect that the moral admired story might not influence our taste perception on sour, bitter or salty. However, on the other hand, the flavor of sweet is correlated with positive affect (Baron , 1997). Hence , it is possible that the moral admired story, for example, the moral story which might introduce the feeling of love, would make people feel more sweet taste, but this positive feeling can’t affect other tastes, like bitter, sour, etc. So we plan to set up three conditions in this study. They are moral disgust condition, moral neutral condition and moral admired condition. In the experiment, participants are asked to evaluate an unknown beverage in a small cup. Actually, the beverage is water, but we told participants it is a new type of beverage. After they are randomly asked to evaluate one of the three types moral stories, participants are further asked to indicate their taste perceptions on different taste dimensions (ie. sweet, sour, bitter, spicy, salty).
The last study is designed for testing a possible moderator on our proposed effect. That is, we suspect that disgust sensitivity might moderate our prediction. So people who are more sensitive towards the disgusting stimulis might show a stronger feeling transferring effect. In other words, those people might feel more stronger on their taste feeling of sour, bitter or salty after evaluating moral disgusting stories.
Ask me relevant reference if you need 2/8/2011
Social responsibility considerations have led car makers and advertisers around the world to adopt self regulatory rules that prohibit promoting fast, flamboyant or outright aggressive driving (see e.g. the European Advertising Standards Alliance, the ICC code on advertising and marketing communication practice or the Committee of Advertising Practice). In other cases, these rules are even enforced by governmental institutions, e.g. in Canada, or similarly on the obligatory display of fuel consumption and CO2 emission enforced by the European Commission (directive (1999/94/EC)28). Interestingly, that same European Commission encourages the publication and display of e.g. NCAP safety scores, which is of course a good thing, because market mechanisms encourage car makers to provide us with cars that have the best safety features possible.
But all safety and no play makes Danny a dull boy. And Danny doesn't want to be a dull boy, not by far...
Risk homeostasis theory (Wilde, 1982) says that people seek an optimal level of risk, where the benefits of taking risk (e.g. getting to an appointment in time, driving fun) balance the drawbacks (e.g. getting a speeding ticket, crashing). Therefore, when security increases, people adjust their behavior so that the resulting risk stays the same. This has been shown with ABS, helmet-wearing cyclists, seatbelts, etc (e.g. Johnson, Jurik, Kreb, & Rose, 1978). Although this theory predicts that accidents stay constant (or decline less than expected), more aggressive driving is less ecologically friendly. Therefore we investigated whether increased perceived safety is enough to create an effect in line with risk homeostasis theory.
To investigate whether this is indeed the fact, we put people in a driving sim, manipulating their idea about whether they were in an especially safe car, or a normal car. Results of a first study showed that indeed, people drive more aggressively in a safe car.
This result is remarkable, especially because a motivational process is unlikely to be involved. There was no punishment or reward associated with driving risky or safe.
A second study revealed that a high promotion or prevention focus is a boundary condition for being susceptible to this effect, or in plain English: people that are highly concerned with the positive or negative consequences of risk adjust their behavior less in response to an altered feeling of safety.
To see whether this is really a fundamental psychological process, and not something that people merely do because it is what they do in an actual car, we wanted to check whether the effect would spill over to something that was not at all driving-related. To do this, we had people evaluate car ads of either safe or less safe cars, and in a second, seemingly unrelated phase presented a task that tests the amount of risk people take in a financial context.
Results show that the same compensation effect occurs, where people that been exposed to the safe car took more risk in the second phase. Additionally, this result was directly driven by the perceived safety of the car (one of the questions of the evaluation), and not by e.g. the price of the car.
These results show that people indeed balance risk in day to day situations, and that this is driven by an altered state of mind that allows for spill-over effects between separate situations. The implications for car advertising could be quite ironic, as talking about the safety of a car could have an impact that is worse than talking about speed and power! 10/18/2010This is a nice further exploration on Bram’s “Bikini effect”. The research is executed by Sescousse and another two researchers from France, in 2010 (paper). I’m sure these authors didn’t read Bram’s paper:(, but the finding itself is interesting, and is an nice extra supplement for Bram’s finding. Interestingly, this research suggested there might be two separate reward networks in our brain. That is, on one hand, this paper supported the previous findings which suspected the existence of a core reward system in brain. This system might include the ventral striatum, ACC, anterior insula, and midbrain, and it processes the incoming rewards or relevant cues regardless of their nature. However, on the other hand, this research also suggested some different regions in OFC might take charge of two different kinds of reward respectively. Specifically, they found the primary reward (This type of reward is relevant with human’s innate value and satisfy people’s biological needs, such as Erotic stimuli.)might stimulate more activities in the posterior OFC region. While the secondary reward (These rewards are derived their values from the primary reward, and appeared in human’s history and their abstract value need to be learned by association with primary reinforcers, such as money.) will activate more activities in the anterior OFC region. Due to the common region which could be activated by any one type of the reward, the authors further suspected that the outcome value of signals computed in the OFC region might be further sent to that common or core network (eg. Like the Verntral striatum, ACC, etc, which are found to be activated by both types of rewards) for additional integration and comparison processes. Hence, this research supplied us a detail view on the brain activities underneath Bram’s effect. That is, it supplied the proof why and how does exposing the primary reward stimuli(eg. Hot girl) influence people’s decision in other domain (Secondary reward, eg. Money). In a word, we might have different regions (it’s different OFC regions in this research) in our brain to charge our reaction towards different rewards. However, both two types of rewards might also share some common regions to further process the outcoming signals from the two separate reward processing system.
Before starting my further discussion, I want to firstly highlight the relevant explanation of primary and secondary rewards, and also mention one previous finding which is also important for my following reasoning:
1. The primary rewards are used to satisfy people’s goal of surviving or basic natural needs (e.g Eating, drinking or mating), while the secondary rewards are needed if people have other high level goals rather than our natural needs goal (eg. Relaxing, enjoying, buying or exchanging, etc)
2. Another research was made by Koechlin and Summerfield in 2007, and they suggested the posterior OFC region is relevant with temporally proximate and concrete action, while the prefrontal regions of OFC is in charged with the abstract actions. Hence, construe level theory might play a role here. That is, the concrete construal level might be relevant with the primary reward, while the abstract construal level might be related with the secondary reward, since brain activation from the abstract construal manipulation and secondary reward shared a same region, and so does the kind of relation between concrete construal level and primary rewards.
We lived in a world that every day is full of making choices of different rewards. It includes that, every day, we pay for rewards, we accept rewards or we reject rewards. Due to the current evidence that our brain might have different regions to deal with the specific rewards: Primary reward or secondary rewards, I further expect that our sensitivity might be different on these two types of reward when we pay, accept or reject these rewards.
Now this is my first question: When do we like to pay more for primary reward (eg. High price for tomatos, sex), when could we endure and accept the more payment for the secondary reward (eg. Music, love). Based on the finding from by Koechlin and Summerfield in 2007, it seems that people would like to pay a higher price on secondary reward when we construe ourselves in a more abstract level rather than a concrete level (eg. When we don’t think about why I will buy the music or how I should spend our money for love, we might be more possible to buy the high price CD or spending much more money on love). On the other hand, when we construe ourselves in a more concrete level, we might be more likely to spend more money on the primary reward (eg. When we don’t think about what is the product we bought for the high price, but think about why we should buy these tomatos or pay for the sex, people might be more likely to buy the higher price tomatos or even made a deal in the unsafe sex exchange. )
My second question seems to be much more stupid, since I want to ask that, in which conditions, people will accept or reject different free rewards offer. Some readers might argue that people accept or reject different rewards according to their current internal goals. We accept food because we are hungry, we accept drinks because we feel thirsty, and we accept music because we want to have relax.More generally, the other reason we accept these kinds of free offer is because we might want to please others or give others “face”. I can’t debate more on these kind of acceptance. But generally, it also seems that people might be more easier to reject the primary reward offer (eg. Food, drinks, sex) than the secondary reward offer(eg. Music, love, money). But why? For example, we might easily to reject the offered sex or food, but if others offered us with money, love or ask if we would like to listen a nice music, we are more likely to accept these offers. Two reasons could help to explain this. Firstly, the secondary reward offers might share much more similarity as the money, which is also a secondary reward. Thus, these rewards like music or love might be evaluated owning higher value than the primary reward. So people might be more easier to reject the primary reward which is perceived having smaller value, but not the secondary reward, which might be perceived more valuable. Secondly, when the offer is from other people, the primary reward might be perceived more disgust and more easier to be contaminated by the former owners, since the primary reward is relevant with our biological need. Imagination of contagion will be much easier to be aligned with these natural rewards. However, the secondary reward is above the natural level, and the contagion procedure because of the owning relation with others will be more difficult to imagine. Therefore, when others offer me a free bread or when they supply me with a free music CD, I might be more likely to say “no “ to the bread offer, but not for the music CD.
10/13/2010Continue to my last post about power. This post is a quiz. There are two questions: 1. Rate the power of brands from high to low(within the each given pair). 2. Rate the brands according to your perceived price from high to low (Within each given pair).
The pairs of brands are: 1. Acer, HP or HP-Acer 2. Carrefour, GB and GB-Carrefour.
You might realize that the pairs stand for two conditions:1. The jointed brand are in equal level (HP and Acer, they are equal good). 2.One of the jointed brand is dominated (Carrefour and GB. Carerefour is more dominated.).
What I want to argue here is that I suspect the jointed brand might never be seen as the most powerful brand or should be set to the highest price. When one brand is dominated, the weaker brand might dilute the power of dominated brand. Thus this dilution effect might cause the undervaluing of jointed brand. So GB-Carrefour is powerless than Carrefour, and it should be cheaper than Carrefour, too. However, I argue the similar effect might even exist when the two brands having similar brand values. I think this might due to the well known preference reversal (Hsee, 1996). That is, people's evaluation outcome might be different when the options are given separately or jointly. People might have no specific preference towards HP or Acer, since they seems as equal good brands. However, when the two brands are connected to make a new brand, people might perceive one brand is better than the others. Hence this generated preference bias might further make people think the new extended brand is a subordinate brand, which will in turn to decrease the power of new brand. Therefore, it might also be dangerous to set up a similar or higher price for the new combined brand (HP-Acer).
Crazy and maybe nonsense thinking from push, I admit relevant research work might be done, but I don't know. This might be one of my cozy snack to share with you during my break when I'm drinking alcohol. You think I am drunk? But 1 plus 1, sometimes, is not equal to 2.
The just published paper (Rucker, Dubois & Galinsky, 2010) on JCR, October, suggested whether to spend your money on yourself or others was depended on your state of power. Comparing to the baseline condition, high power could increase the self-importance but not decrease dependence on others. And this intensified self importance would further cause more money spending on self rather than others. On the other hand, low power could increase dependence on others but not influence self importance, and this highlighted dependence on others will further push consumers to spend more on others rather than self. The aforementioned main finding of that paper is interesting, I think. It further stimulates five questions from me.
Q1: The author argued that low power could facilitate people's dependence on others. Could we reason in an opposite way? Do you think the interdependent people are less powerful than independent people if we look at them individually (ie. It is one interdependent people and one independent people but not groups). For instance, is an interdependent Japanese perceived less powerful than one independent German?
Q2: Lots of current research (including this paper) focused on the influence of power after relevant power manipulation? However, less is discussed about consumers' perception on the power of products, brands or the producers. However, it seems for me, power as an independent measure, should be positively correlated with consumers’ attitude on products, brands and the manufacturers. For example, consumer might think BMW is a powerful brand, and Mac pro is a powerful laptop. Thus, they might be more likely to spend money or pay high price. Hence, it might be interesting to further manipulate the power on products, brands or producers. For instance, if we let people think about the power of iphone, people might be more possible to pay a higher price.
Q3: This question came out from my question 1 and 2. These days, companies also become more interdependent. For instance, consumers are seeing lots of products made by a two-jointed companies or more than two companies. We also see some brand name is just a simple connected brand name. One famous of these example is Sony Ericsson. Would consumers like to pay more to buy the Sony Ericsson mobile phone? It might not. Why? I thought it might be due to the powerless of the new brand name. Came back to my question 1, it might also be that the behavior of depending on others would harm people's perception on the power of brand. Here, the new brand name Sony Ericsson might sounds less powerful than Sony or Ericsson itself. For example, some consumers might argue that why sony can't make the product by itself. Thus, the power of sony ericssion mobile phone might be weaker than the sony mobile phone itself. Hence, consumers might not like to pay a higher price for sony ercssion mobile phone than the sony mobile phone. However, I should admit that self construal might moderate my suspected result. That is, interdependent people rather than independent people would think the joint- brand is more powerful, and then they would like to pay more on the product, since I guess this is because interdependent people depend on others and the connection between brands will make them feel the new brand is more powerful.
Q4: Does the power manipulation could influence our physical power? That is, do people feel more energy in the powerful state? For instance, does the athletes run faster if we let them feel they are in a power state? Do the cashiers become faster when they're checking the purchasing in supermarket?
Q5: I have this question for a long time. Why are the politicians good liars (Maybe not?)? Why do the politicians behave so good in public or in front of TV? Is that because they have more power? So my question is does the power facilitate people's self regulation, especially when there is a third person besides? It is interesting since the paper I listed investigated the influence of power on spending, and it found people would spend more on self when they felt more power. However, I thought the result might be reversed if the used stimuli is a tempting offer. That is, high power people might have better self control on themselves when there is a tempting. I found three reasons to support my argument: 1. High power people might have stronger motivations on the self oriented goal (eg. Dieting ), thus the stronger motivation would strengthen their willpower, which will further help them to conquer the luring from temptation. 2. By accepting the free tempting offer or negative evaluated tempting offer (eg. A fat food rather than healthy food) might hurt their powerful state (Eg. I don’t need free offer because I'm powerful. I’m different with the people who ate unhealthy food in the cheap KFC.) 3.High power people might be more careful when make decisions since they might be more afraid to make mistakes. Thus, they might be more likely to reject the free tempting offer or the negative evaluated tempting offer, since the free offer and the negative evaluated tempting offer might bring in much more uncertainty or risks.
10/5/2010A recent research paper on psychological science suggested that benign moral violations tend to elicit laughter and amusement in addition to disgust (McGraw & Warren, 2010). That is, for an event or behavior, if people think it is not harmful, but at the same time, if they also think the event or behavior violates our moral judgment, humor or amusement might be aroused subsequently by these people.
For example, there is a news like this: A recent research suggested drinking people's urine could enhance the function of our body immune system, so Coca Cola inc. decides to develop and launch a green urine beverage in market next month. What will be our reaction towards this news?
Drew out our prediction from this paper, we might feel disgust and funny at the same time, since producing pee beverage is seen as abnormal based on our traditional knowledge on the soft drink product, but the behavior of producing pee drinks is not harmful for ourselves (eg. We might not plan to buy the beverage.). Therefore, people will feel both disgust and funny at the same time if they notice the news is a kind of benign moral violation.
The authors suggested several moderators on this effect. For instance, they suggested people will feel more disgust rather than funny when one is weakly committed to the violated norm (eg. Religious people feel more disgust rather than funny when there is a religious joke) or when one feels psychologically distant from the violation (eg. People feel more funny and disgust on the benign moral violation news after manipulating them to feel psychologically far from the violation). However, there also might be other factors besides these aforementioned moderators. For instance, familiarity or your relationship with the people who made the moral violation actions. Although someone might argue that these are similar factors as the aforementioned psychological factor, there might be difference here. Please imagine your reaction towards these three scenarios: 1. A man is drinking urine beverage in the street. 2. One of your professor drinks the urine beverage during the class break 3. You saw your father drank urine beverage yesterday when you went back home. Here, before our discussion, please notice that your relationships with these targets (ie. A man, one of your professor, and your father) are from far to close. So what’s your reactions after these imaginations? You might feel disgust within all the three cases. But do you feel more funny for the first case than the second and third case? I think it might not. For me, people might feel more funny on the second case rather than the first and third case. That is, in my opinion, when the relationship is too close (ie. Your father), the behavior of moral violation is seen as less benign (ie. It’s harmful to your family). Thus, people will feel less funny. On the other hand, when the relationship is too far (eg. A man in the street), you might be less surprised on this behavior since these types of abnormal behavior happened every day. Hence, the effect from moral violation on strangers is much more weaker than when the same moral violation happened on a people you knew (eg. I don’t believe my professor will drink that beverage vs. It’s one of the freaks in the street.) Therefore, I further argue that, besides the benign violation hypothesis, un-expectation or surprise might also be a very important factor to contribute humor. And indeed the emotion of disgust and amusement could cogenerated by the same stimulis which are seen as benign moral violations.
9/20/2010Some aged people I met told me they would never buy Iphone, since they don't know and never want to learn how to use so many extra functions. " I only need a phone can call!" They said.
Is there a way to persuade those conservative people to change their mind? For instance, if we can manipulate and make them to think more creative, will they consider an iphone as an option?
A current research made by Chermahini and Hommel (2010) found that blinking can facilitate creative thinking, and this is due to blinking could enhance the generation of Dopamine, which is seen to promote generating creative mindset.
I think it is an interesting new direction for consumer behavior researchers, since it does not only supply us a new way to categorize our consumers through their biological behavior(eg. Frequency of Blinking), but it also suggests another fresh manipulation method which could further influence consumers' subsequent behavior (ie. More creative thinking). A more detail of the discussed research could be checked from this link, which is a research review wrote by Kaufman.
Thus, for the example I just wrote, Mac could try to suggest those less motivated consumers blinking their eyes (eg. Kidding saying:) Sir, there have something near your eyelash, you should blink it to make it out.) before the company tries to persuade those consumers to make buying decisions. |
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